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INTRODUCTION
Legalization of recreational marijuana has gained momentum in the
United States. As of December 2021, 18 states, Washington D.C., and
Guam have legalized recreational marijuana.1 The relatively broad support
at the state level, however, has not always been reflected at the local level.
For example, in California — which has been at the forefront of efforts to
liberalize marijuana laws since 19962 — two-thirds of municipalities
banned marijuana cultivation and retail sales,3 and in 2019, 24 local

*

Lecturer in American Law, Associate Director of the Centre for American Legal Studies,
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1. Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Vermont,
Virginia, and Washington. See Michael Hartman, Cannabis Overview, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES (July 6, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice
/marijuana-overview.aspx [https://perma.cc/E92D-DSMB].
2. Cannabis in California has been legal for medical use since 1996 and for
recreational use since late 2016. See id.
3. Editorial, Editorial: What Legalization? California Is Still the Wild West of Illegal
Marijuana, L.A. TIMES (July 15, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/
opinion/story/2021-07-15/illegal-marijuana-desert [https://perma.cc/HM93-FADJ].
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governments sued the state to block local home delivery of marijuana.4 In
Michigan, about 80 communities have opted out of the legalization law
adopted by voters in November 2018.5 In New Jersey, about one in four
municipalities have introduced or adopted ordinances barring marijuanarelated businesses.6
From a first glance, these local ordinances resemble similar push-back
attempts of local authorities to regulate fracking,7 firearms,8 minimum
wage,9 genetically modified organisms (GMOs),10 plastic bags,11 and more
recently — COVID-related mandates.12 States have generally sought to
strike down local regulations in these areas by issuing pre-emptive
legislation.13 But marijuana is exceptional. Remarkably, some states have
left localities free to opt-out of the legalization and impose local bans on
dispensaries. In New Jersey and New York, for example, states have set a
deadline for municipalities to opt-out of the legalization of marijuana
commerce.14
By using marijuana as a case study to understand the compromise
between state and local government competing interests, this Essay
explores the often-overlooked area of police powers granted to local

4. See Patrick McGreevy, California Cities Sue State over Home Deliveries of Pot,
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-californiasued-pot-deliveries-20190405-story.html [https://perma.cc/D8XE-KLNA].
5. See Alan Greenblatt, Legal in the State or Not, Some Cities Ban Marijuana,
GOVERNING (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.governing.com/archive/gov-legal-recreationalmarijuana-cities-ban-sales.html [https://perma.cc/CBZ7-X6CD].
6. See Tracey Tully, The $8 Billion Question: Which Towns Will Cash In on
Marijuana?, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/19/
nyregion/marijuana-sales-ny-nj-conn.html [https://perma.cc/2VU5-AHTH].
7. See generally Jamal Knight & Bethany Gullman, The Power of State Interest:
Preemption of Local Fracking Ordinances in Home-Rule Cities, 28 TUL. ENVT’L. L.J. 297
(2015).
8. See Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. L. REV.
1995, 1999 (2018) (“As of 2013 . . . forty-five states preempted local firearms regulation.”).
9. See Alexsis M. Johnson, Note, Intersectionality Squared: Intrastate Minimum Wage
Preemption & Schuette’s Second-Class Citizens, 37 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 36, 36 (2018).
10. See Jacob Garner & Ian Wesley-Smith, Note, State Preemption of Local GMO
Regulation: An Analysis of Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. County of Kauai, 47 URB. LAW. 275, 276
(2015).
11. See Madison Guyton, Note, Bans on Bans: Plastic Bags, Power, and Home Rule in
South Carolina, 71 S.C. L. REV. 801, 802 (2020).
12. See David Gartner, Pandemic Preemption: Limits on Local Control over Public
Health, 13 NE. U. L. REV. 733, 735 (2021).
13. Scholars have noted an increase in state pre-emption efforts. See generally Richard
C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163 (2018); Erin Adele
Scharff, Hyper Preemption: A Reordering of the State-Local Relationship?, 106 GEO. L.J.
1469 (2018).
14. See Tully, supra note 6.
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municipalities. Part I of this Essay will provide the context within which
state pre-emption exists, considering areas where states have traditionally
pre-empted local ordinances. Part II will consider the decriminalization of
marijuana as a case study in understanding and exploring the alternatives to
fully-fledged state pre-emption. It will also explore the different ways in
which states have negotiated with and delegated to municipalities the
authority to ban marijuana business, with particular reference to California,
New Jersey, and New York. Finally, this Essay will conclude that the optout approach taken by the states in the legalization of marijuana could
represent a possible solution for other intrastate conflicts and that state
legislatures could benefit from the marijuana experience. State legislatures
can use the marijuana experience to create alternatives to court pre-emption
of local policies and identify new collaborative strategies with local
governments.
I. THE RISE OF INTRASTATE PRE-EMPTION
Intrastate pre-emption is on the rise. States have traditionally preempted local ordinances that do not comply with state law, but recently
state legislatures have made broader use of pre-emption. In 2018, the
National League of Cities reported a rise in the number of pre-emption
statutes in the areas of minimum wage, paid leave, anti-discrimination,
ride-sharing, home-sharing, municipal broadband, tax, and expenditure
limitations.15 Legal scholars have argued that this increase in the use of
pre-emption statutes constitutes an “attack on American cities,”16 as it is
representative of an anti-urban disadvantage in national and state lawmaking17 and that “the breadth and ambition of the recent preemption
efforts have rarely been seen in American history.”18
In addition to the increase of pre-emption statutes, scholars have
observed a change in the nature of the statutes, which are more aggressive.
For example, Professor Erin Adele Scharff of Arizona State University has
published extensive research on the rise of so-called hyper pre-emption
statutes, statutes that not only assert state authority over a specific policy
area but also include broad punitive measures, which apply a fiscally-

15. See CTR. FOR CITY SOLS., NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, CITY RIGHTS IN AN ERA OF
PREEMPTION: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS 3 (2018), https://www.nlc.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/02/NLC-SML-Preemption-Report-2017-pages.pdf [https://perma.cc/QZ9D9LLP].
16. Schragger, supra note 13, at 1168.
17. See Paul A. Diller, Reorienting Home Rule: Part 1 — The Urban Disadvantage in
National and State Lawmaking, 77 LA. L. REV. 287, 290 (2016).
18. Kenneth A. Stahl, Preemption, Federalism, and Local Democracy, 44 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 133, 134 (2017).
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disabling sanction whenever a locality is deemed in violation with state
law.19 Furthermore, the phenomenon of punitive pre-emptive statutes has
been termed by Professor Richard Briffault, the “new preemption”20 and by
Bradley Pough, Deputy Associate Counsel in the White House Office of
Presidential Personnel, a “super preemption” with particular reference to
those statutes aimed at holding local actors personally accountable for
ordinances that impermissibly expand local power.21 Studies have also
been conducted to identify the origin of pre-emption bills. Professor
Jessica Bulman-Pozen, in particular, has contributed to the study of preemption as a nation-wide phenomenon and has investigated the role of
interest groups such as the American Legislative Exchange Council or the
National Rifle Association in encouraging the enactment of pre-emption
bills by drafting model pre-emption legislation and “shop[ping] it to state
lawmakers across the country.”22 Her study confirms that pre-emption is a
national phenomenon and that it is the product of broader national
dynamics related to the polarization of U.S. politics rather than an
individual state issue.
The connection between pre-emption and polarization has also been
investigated by political scientists who suggested that the primary cause of
the rise of pre-emption is to be found in the polarization of U.S. politics
and that pre-emptive statutes are attempts to control political defection of
local authorities by legal means.23 Political scientists have speculated on
the political meaning of pre-emption. For example, Professor Vladimir
Kogan argued that engaging in political quibbles is actually beneficial for
mayors because “[p]icking fights with state government over high-profile
issues is a great way for big-city mayors to attract national notoriety.”24
He, therefore, identified the political value of pre-emption statutes in the
context of an increasingly polarized state politics.25
The connection between pre-emption and political polarization had been
further evidenced by Professor Kenneth A. Stahl in his study of North
Carolina’s HB2 (a Bathroom Bill) that pre-empted the city of Charlotte’s

19. See Scharff, supra note 13, at 1495.
20. See Briffault, supra note 8, at 1997.
21. See Bradley Pough, Understanding the Rise of Super Preemption in State
Legislatures, 34 J.L. & POL. 67, 69 (2018).
22. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, State-Local Preemption: Parties, Interest Groups, and
Overlapping Government, 51 POL. SPOTLIGHT 26, 27–28 (2018).
23. See Luke Fowler & Stephanie L. Witt, State Preemption of Local Authority:
Explaining Patterns of State Adoption of Preemption Measures, 49 PUBLIUS 540, 559
(2019).
24. Vladimir Kogan, Means, Motives, and Opportunities in the New Preemption Wars,
51 POL. SPOTLIGHT 26, 28–29 (2018).
25. See id.
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effort to provide civil rights protections for transgender individuals.26 In
2017, during the first year of the Trump Administration, Professor Stahl
argued that “preemption has become more prevalent because cities are now
overwhelmingly Democratic while state legislatures, dominated by
representatives of rural areas, are overwhelmingly Republican.”27 One may
wonder if things had changed since the 2020 elections and the change of
administration.
As of June 2021, with the Democratic Biden Administration, preemption was still thriving. Forty-two states have pre-empted the local
regulation of firearms,28 and 23 states have pre-empted local smoking
restrictions in government worksites, private worksites, restaurants, or
bars.29 The COVID-19 pandemic has also exposed major intrastate
conflicts. Where governors had initially refused to issue lock-down orders
and mask mandates, some cities and counties issued separate local
restrictions such as “masking” and “stay-at-home” orders.30 Governors
responded to these conflicting local measures by issuing executive orders
that pre-empted localities from implementing those restrictions that went
beyond state policies.31
For instance, on March 25, 2021, Arizona Governor Doug Ducey signed
an executive order that prohibited local authorities from enacting mask
mandates or making any order in conflict with state policy,32 and in May

26. See Stahl, supra note 18, at 154.
27. Id. at 134.
28. Preemption of Local Laws, GIFFORDS L. CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE,
http://smartgunlaws.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/other-laws-policies/preemption-of-locallaws/ [https://perma.cc/NW2E-FDNA] (last visited Feb. 17, 2022).
29. STATE System Preemption Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION
(Dec. 6, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/statesystem/factsheets/preemption/Preemption.html#
anchor_1562857500 [https://perma.cc/G3BC-P6YB].
30. See Nestor M. Davidson & Kim Haddow, State Preemption and Local Responses in
the Pandemic, AM. CONST. SOC’Y (June 22, 2020), https://www.acslaw.org/expert
forum/state-preemption-and-local-responses-in-the-pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/W9CC-QR
A6].
31. See Carol S. Weissert et al., Governors in Control: Executive Orders, State-Local
Preemption, and the COVID-19 Pandemic, 51 PUBLIUS 396, 396–97 (2021). See generally
SPENCER WAGNER, BROOKS RAINWATER & KATHERINE CARTER, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES,
PREEMPTION AND THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: EXPLORING STATE INTERFERENCE BEFORE,
DURING, & AFTER THE CRISIS (2020), https://www.nlc.org/wp-content/uploads
/2020/11/COVID-19_Preemption_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/AFA8-TYBY].
32. Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2021-06 (2021) (“Pursuant to A.R.S. § 26-307, no county,
city or town may make or issue any order, rule or regulation that conflicts with or is in
addition to the policy, directives or intent of this or any other Executive Order relating to the
COVID-19 public health emergency, or any other order, rule or regulation that was not in
place as of March 11, 2020. This includes but is not limited to mandated use of face
coverings. Any city, town or county that has a rule, regulation or ordinance not in place as
of March 11, 2020 that is in conflict with the provisions of this order shall not be enforced.

622

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLIX

2021, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis issued an executive order that
suspended and prohibited all local COVID-19 restrictions in the state,
including mask rules.33
In Georgia, Governor Brian P. Kemp attempted to pre-empt local
restrictions and even sued the city of Atlanta for issuing local mask
mandates and going beyond state guidelines. Particularly remarkable was
the executive order issued by Atlanta Mayor Keisha Lance Bottoms on July
8, 2020, that required restaurants to only have takeout and curbside pickup, people to wear masks, shelter-in-place at home, and only leave for
essential tasks.34 The order went beyond state restrictions which allowed
restaurants to reopen with restrictions and did not require masks. Governor
Kemp’s immediate reaction was to issue an executive order that forbid
local authorities from issuing mask mandates.35 In an attempt to further
settle the dispute with local authorities, Governor Kemp sued Atlanta
Mayor Keisha Lance Bottoms for having “exceeded her authority by
issuing executive orders which were more restrictive than his Executive
Orders related to the Public Health Emergency.”36 The Superior Court of
Fulton County sent the case for mediation,37 but the parties could not
compromise.38 Governor Kemp eventually dropped the lawsuit and
decided instead to issue a new executive order that allowed local authorities
to issue “Local Option Face Covering Requirement” only in public and on
government property but restricted them from issuing mask mandates on

Political subdivisions maintain the right to set and enforce mitigation policies in their own
government buildings and on public transportation, including, but not limited to, requiring
face coverings.”).
33. Fla. Exec. Order No. 21-102 § 3 (2021) (“For the remaining duration of the state of
emergency initiated by Executive Order 20-52, no county or municipality may renew or
enact an emergency order or ordinance, using a local state of emergency or using emergency
enactment procedures under Chapters 125, 252, or 166, Florida Statutes, that imposes
restrictions or mandates upon businesses or individuals due to the COVID-19 emergency.”).
34. City of Atlanta Exec. Order No. 2020-113 (2020).
35. Ga. Exec. Order No. 07.15.20.01 (2020) (“[A]ny . . . county, or municipal law,
order, ordinance, rule, or regulation that requires persons to wear face coverings, masks,
face shields, or any other Personal Protective Equipment while in places of public
accommodation or on public property are suspended to the extent that they are more
restrictive than this Executive Order.”).
36. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 9, Kemp v. Bottoms, No.
2020CV338387, 2020 WL 4036827 (Ga. Super. Ct. July 16, 2020).
37. See Katheryn Hayes Tucker, ‘Kemp v. Bottoms’ Mask Lawsuit Heads to Mediation,
Law.com (July 23, 2020, 8:39 PM), https://www.law.com/dailyreportonline/2020/07/23/
kemp-v-bottoms-mask-lawsuit-heads-to-mediation/?slreturn=20220117221012
[https://perma.cc/UJG7-AVU7].
38. See Vanessa Romo, Governor Drops Lawsuit Against Mayor over Masks, but Fight
May Not Be Over, NPR (Aug. 13, 2020, 7:14 PM), npr.org/sections/coronavirus-liveupdates/2020/08/13/902347003/governor-drops-lawsuit-against-atlanta-mayor-over-masksbut-fight-may-not-be-ove [https://perma.cc/XT2F-W295].
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private property.39 The Georgia case demonstrates that even though preemption is still the first choice in case of intrastate conflict, there are
effective alternatives to pre-emption and that they reside in the realm of
political negotiation and compromise.
II. THE DELEGATION OF MARIJUANA POLICE POWERS
TO MUNICIPALITIES
State pre-emption of local laws is often considered as the only solution
to intrastate conflict. However, the recent wide-spread delegation of
marijuana regulatory powers to municipalities shows that there is a
workable alternative to top-down policies and that it is possible to reconcile
state and local government competing interests. The original research
conducted for this Essay shows that 17 out of the 18 states that have
decriminalized the cultivation, sale, and other marijuana operations,40 have
successfully negotiated and resolved political conflicts with local
governments by including an opt-out clause for municipalities that do not
wish to participate in the legalization of commercial marijuana activities.41
The opt-out schemes differ in each state, and this Part will review a few
examples of the different ways in which states have granted authority to
regulate the business of marijuana to their localities.
The first consideration is that states usually include the opt-clause in the
decriminalization statute. One exception is Colorado, which has included
the opt-out clause in the home-rule provisions contained in the state
constitution.42 The other states have enacted statutes and regulations that
set out the extent to which localities can prohibit marijuana commerce and
enact zoning laws and local land use regulations.43 Alaska’s recreational
marijuana statute, for example, provides that: “A local government may
prohibit the operation of marijuana cultivation facilities, marijuana product
manufacturing facilities, marijuana testing facilities, or retail marijuana
39. See id.; see also Executive Order Allows ‘Local Option Face Covering
Requirement,’ NAT’L FED’N INDEP. BUS. (Aug. 15, 2020), https://www.nfib.com/
content/news/coronavirus-state/executive-order-allows-local-option-face-coveringrequirement/ [https://perma.cc/8JCD-LRD2].
40. Namely Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon,
Vermont, Virginia, and Washington. Decriminalization in the states is tracked by the
National Conference of State Legislatures. See Hartman, supra note 1.
41. See Ilaria Di Gioia, Decriminalization of Recreational Marijuana in 18 States: OptOut Provisions (on file with the author).
42. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16, cl. 5 (“A locality may prohibit the operation of
marijuana cultivation facilities [and other marijuana operations] . . . .”).
43. For a survey of land use restrictions related to cannabis dispensaries, see William C.
Bunting & James M. Lammendola, Why Localism Is Bad for Business: Land Use
Regulation of the Cannabis Industry, 17 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 267, 271 (2021).
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stores through the enactment of an ordinance or by a voter initiative.”44
Like Alaska, the majority of the states require municipalities to either pass
an ordinance or hold a referendum.45
Some states are more cautious.
Massachusetts, for example,
differentiates between municipalities that voted against the 2016 ballot
initiative to legalize marijuana and those that voted in favor.46 Only the
municipalities that voted against decriminalization could adopt ordinances
and bylaws that prohibit the operation of one or more types of marijuana
establishments within the city or town, limit or ban the number of
marijuana establishments in their jurisdiction, or restrict the licensed
cultivation, processing, and manufacturing of marijuana.47 Those that
voted in favor of decriminalization, instead, were required to hold a
referendum on the issue called upon the petition of at least 10% of voters.48
Massachusetts is also cautious in authorizing municipalities to pass bylaws
and ordinances governing the “time, place and manner” of marijuana
establishments.49 The language of the law only allows for “reasonable
safeguards . . . provided they are not unreasonably impracticable and are
not in conflict with this chapter or with regulations made pursuant to this
chapter.”50 The state legislators here have been careful in giving out
discretion to the municipalities, and it is possible to read between the lines
the concern that municipalities may regulate beyond their competences.
Similarly, the state of Montana legalized marijuana in 2020, after
passing I-190, the Marijuana Legalization Initiative.51 Montana requires
cities that wish to opt-out to hold a local referendum,52 which is to be
petitioned by 15% of voters.53
The state of Virginia is also very cautious. It only legalized cultivation
and possession of marijuana in 2021 but subjected the retail sales

44. ALASKA STAT. § 17.38.210 (2022).
45. See generally Bunting & Lammendola, supra note 43.
46. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94G, § 3(a)(2) (West 2022).
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id. § 3(a)(1).
50. Id. (“A city or town may adopt ordinances and by-laws that impose reasonable
safeguards on the operation of marijuana establishments, provided they are not unreasonably
impracticable and are not in conflict with this chapter or with regulations made pursuant to
this chapter.”).
51. See German Lopez, Montana Just Voted to Legalize Marijuana, VOX (Nov. 4, 2020,
6:02 AM), https://www.vox.com/2020/11/4/21514885/montana-marijuana-legalizationci118-i190-results [https://perma.cc/Y39Y-RAGC].
52. See id.
53. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-5-132 (West 2017).
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provisions to a ‘re-enactment’ of the law in the 2022 legislative session.54
As the law stands, municipalities can opt-out of the commercialization of
marijuana only after holding a referendum that can be petitioned by the
governing body of a locality to the circuit court.55
This Part started with the premise that 17 out of the 18 states that have
legalized recreational marijuana allow municipalities to opt-out. The
exception is the state of New Mexico. In this state, local governments can
limit the number of dispensaries or adopt time, place, and manner
regulations but cannot ban them entirely.56 A proposed amendment that
would have allowed local governments to opt-out of legalization was
rejected by both the New Mexico House and Senate before the Cannabis
Regulation Act was passed by the Legislature on March 31, 2021, during a
special session called for that purpose.57 The reason for the rejection of the
opt-out provision was “to stamp out the black market and avoid a
regulatory patch-quilt.”58 The rationale here is that opt-out zones can
become breeding grounds for an illicit market.59 As seen before, the
approach of New Mexico is exceptional and should be treated as the
exception that proves the rule.
The Essay now proceeds to review and discuss the opt-out provisions in
three states: California, New Jersey, and New York. These states have
been chosen because they represent a range of approaches to delegation.
California is very generous with localities and authorized cities and
counties to completely prohibit all types of marijuana businesses. New
Jersey represents a middle ground: it allowed municipalities a window of
180 days in 2021 to opt-out of the sale operations municipalities and also

54. See 2021 VA. LEGIS. SERV. 550 (West) (“The provisions of §§ 4.1–1101.1 and 4.1–
1105.1 of the Code of Virginia, as created by this act, shall expire on January 1, 2024, if the
provisions of the first, third, and fourth enactments of this act are reenacted by the 2022
Session of the General Assembly.”).
55. See id. § 4.1-629 (“The governing body of a locality may, by resolution, petition the
circuit court for the locality for a referendum on the question of whether retail marijuana
stores should be prohibited in the locality.”).
56. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 26-2C-12(B) (West 2021) (“A local jurisdiction shall
not . . . completely prohibit the operation of a licensee.”).
57. See Adrian Hedden, Legalize It? Carlsbad Leaders Resistant to Recreational
Marijuana in New Mexico, CARLSBAD CURRENT-ARGUS (Apr. 4, 2021, 9:04 AM),
https://www.currentargus.com/story/news/local/2021/04/03/new-mexico-marijuanacarlsbad-leaders-resistant-legalization/4835229001/ [https://perma.cc/M8XE-SAHH].
58. Morgan Lee, Cities Can’t Opt Out of Legal Pot Under New State Proposal, AP
NEWS (Jan. 18, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/health-marijuana-new-mexico-bills-santafe-9d9f4aeee1509a7a64ff42dec450e1b5 [https://perma.cc/3JXD-7HVX].
59. See Michael McDevitt, New Mexico Might Legalize Marijuana. Here’s What You
Need to Know About the Proposal., LAS CRUCES SUN NEWS (Jan. 18, 2020, 5:11 PM),
https://www.lcsun-news.com/story/news/2020/01/17/new-mexico-mulling-marijuanalegalization-what-know-proposal/4455250002/ [https://perma.cc/UV4A-GENN].
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allowed municipalities that did not meet the 2021 deadline to opt-out again
in five years. New York is more restrictive; it provided for a final deadline
in 2021 and did not give the option to opt-out at a future date.60
Furthermore, to opt-out, localities cannot simply enact a local ordinance
but must hold a local referendum on the issue.61
III. RECREATIONAL MARIJUANA ‘OPT-OUT’ PROVISIONS
IN CALIFORNIA
The testing ground for state-municipality compromise related to
legalization of commercial cannabis has arguably been California. The
Golden State was the first state to legalize the use of marijuana for medical
purposes in 199662 and for recreational purposes in 2016.63 According to
data from a 2019 study, two-thirds of California municipalities prohibited
commercial cannabis activities,64 and according to Forbes, most cities in
the state still do not allow retail adult-use sales as of September 2021.65
The authority to ban marijuana commercial activities is granted by the
California legislation, which authorizes cities and counties “to completely
prohibit the establishment or operation of one or more types of [marijuana]
businesses . . . within the local jurisdiction.”66 The delegation of complete
discretion to localities makes California one of the most liberal states when
it comes to decentralization of powers.
The consequence is that California today is a patchwork of regulations
with its 58 counties and 482 municipalities having different regulations for
the cultivation, manufacturing, and retail of marijuana.67 In southern
California, for example, the counties of San Bernardino and Kern ban all

60. See N.Y. CANNABIS LAW § 131 (McKinney 2021).
61. See id.
62. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b)(1)(A) (West 1996).
63. See Proposition 64: The Adult Use of Marijuana Act, CAL. CTS.,
https://www.courts.ca.gov/prop64.htm [https://perma.cc/6NAB-GL5D] (last visited Feb. 17,
2022); see also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 26000 (West 2022).
64. See John Schroyer & Eli McVey, Chart: Most California Municipalities Ban
Commercial Cannabis Activity, MJBIZDAILY (Dec. 17, 2021), https://mjbizdaily.com/chartmost-of-california-municipalities-ban-commercial-cannabis-activity/
[https://perma.cc/L5ZK-2NQT].
65. See Chris Roberts, ‘It’s Gonna Be a Bloodbath’: Epic Marijuana Oversupply Is
Flooding California, Jeopardizing Legalization, FORBES (Aug. 31, 2021, 7:25 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrisroberts/2021/08/31/its-gonna-be-a-bloodbath-epicmarijuana-oversupply-is-flooding-california-jeopardizing-legalization/?sh=5232f29a7ddb
[https://perma.cc/R3MZ-QJX3].
66. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 26200(a)(1) (West 2022).
67. See California Cannabis Laws by County, CANNABUSINESS L., https://canna
businesslaw.com/california-cannabis-laws-by-county/?location=San-Diego
[https://perma.cc/DDX7-GGML] (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
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commercial marijuana operations, but the nearby counties of Los Angeles
and Riverside have allowed them.68 San Diego is an exception because it
only allows cultivation but not manufacturing or retail.69 Incorporated
cities may also have their own local policies for regulating commercial
marijuana activities separate from county regulations.70 In August 2021,
the media outlets reported that more cities were embracing
decriminalization and that they were issuing a variety of marijuana
licenses.71
From a purely theoretical point of view, California is an exemplary case
study of intrastate federalism and the promotion of localism/local
governance.72 In practice, unfortunately, zoning and the heavy regulatory
burdens imposed by localities have not helped with tackling the illegal
marijuana industry, which is still the prevalent market in California.73 The
Los Angeles Times has defined California as “the Wild West of illegal
marijuana” and argues that the illicit market remains three times as large as
the legal market.74 This is because, according to the same newspaper, high
state and local taxes can add 50% or more to the price of the product in
legal shops, and there has been little enforcement against illegal marijuana
operators.75
Author Lori Lang argued that the black market is a consequence of “the
amalgamation of local regulations and prohibitions that are inconsistent
with state law” and that “the leakage of legally grown marijuana into an
illegal market is made substantially easier when a locality introduces strict
regulation or prohibition.”76 Local restrictions have, arguably, curtailed the
effectiveness of the decriminalization effort in the state and prevented the
marijuana market from booming.77

68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See, e.g., John Schroyer, California Marijuana Market Keeps Growing as More
Cities, Counties Embrace MJ, MJBIZDAILY (Dec. 17, 2021), https://mjbizdaily.
com/california-marijuana-market-keeps-growing-as-more-cities-counties-embrace-mj/
[https://perma.cc/Q98C-2NFK].
72. See Robert A. Mikos, Marijuana Localism, 65 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 719, 720
(2015). See generally Stahl, supra note 18.
73. See Editorial, supra note 3.
74. Id.
75. See id.
76. Lori Lang, Comment, “The Great Pot Experiment”: A Budding Industry Wouldn’t It
Be Better if It Was a Legal Billion-Dollar Industry?, 20 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 82, 110
(2020).
77. See Alexander Nieves, California’s Legal Weed Industry Can’t Compete with Illicit
Market, POLITICO (Oct. 23, 2021, 7:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/
2021/10/23/california-legal-illicit-weed-market-516868 [https://perma.cc/E52Y-NZGR].
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Here, the discourse around decriminalization intertwines with broader
considerations around the correct balance between delegation and state
regulation. California is an interesting case study as it represents one of the
most — if not the most — generous state towards local governments. Its
approach to state pre-emption of local authority has also been very
moderate. The California Supreme Court has corroborated this ‘soft’
approach in 2013 when it concluded that the Compassionate Use Act and
Medical Marijuana Program Act — which, respectively, permit the use of
medical marijuana and make lawful the possession or cultivation of
marijuana by a patient — did not “expressly or impliedly preempt[ ] the
authority of California cities and counties . . . to allow, restrict, limit, or
entirely exclude facilities that distribute medical marijuana.”78 In that
occasion, the court added a vision for state pre-emption in general and
remarkably declared that pre-emption is not “lightly presumed,” leaving
room for the empowerment of local authorities in other policy areas:
The California Constitution recognizes the authority of cities and counties
to make and enforce, within their borders, “all local, police, sanitary, and
other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws.” This
inherent local police power includes broad authority to determine, for
purposes of the public health, safety, and welfare, the appropriate uses of
land within a local jurisdiction’s borders, and preemption by state law is
not lightly presumed.79

The case study of California shows that an extensive delegation of powers
to localities is supported by explicit delegation language both in the
legislation and in the jurisprudence and that the path towards localism and
intrastate collaboration passes inevitably by a broader favorable attitude of
the state towards delegation of police powers.
To further corroborate this point, it should be noted that the California
marijuana opt-out provisions go hand to hand with a broader recognition of
city powers enshrined in the California Constitution.80 From this
perspective, marijuana is therefore only one of the fields in which
California expresses its liberal approach to delegation of powers to
localities.

78. City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health & Wellness Ctr., Inc., 300 P.3d
494, 512 (Cal. 2013).
79. Id. at 496 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7).
80. See CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7.
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IV. RECREATIONAL MARIJUANA ‘OPT-OUT’ PROVISIONS
IN NEW JERSEY
New Jersey is a recent example of decriminalization and
experimentation in delegation of power to municipalities. The Garden
State has used a silent-assent approach for decriminalization of marijuana
business and had allowed municipalities a window of 180 days to opt-out
within the borders of their jurisdiction.81 If a municipality did not pass an
opt-out ordinance by the deadline, marijuana businesses such as cultivators,
manufacturers, wholesalers, or distributors are automatically permitted to
operate in the municipality. This Part reviews New Jersey’s provisions for
delegation to municipalities as elaborated by the state’s Cannabis
Regulatory Commission (CRC) and argues that they are a good example of
collaborative intrastate federalism.
The decriminalization of recreational marijuana followed a 2020
referendum on legalization in which New Jersey voters approved an
amendment to the state constitution to legalize the recreational use of
marijuana by people age 21 and older, with 67% voting yes and 33%
voting no.82 New Jersey had previously legalized the medical use of
marijuana under the Jake Honig Compassionate Use Medical Cannabis
Act.83
On February 22, 2021, New Jersey Governor Phil Murphy signed three
bills that legalized the use of recreational marijuana and established
regulations of the marijuana marketplace.84 The first bill, titled the
Cannabis Regulatory, Enforcement Assistance, and Marketplace
Modernization Act, legalizes and regulates marijuana use and possession

81. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6I–45.b (West 2022).
82. See New Jersey Public Question 1, Marijuana Legalization Amendment (2020),
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/New_Jersey_Public_Question_1,_Mari
juana_Legalization_Amendment_(2020) [https://perma.cc/W8DF-7SVM] (last visited Feb.
17, 2022).
83. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6I-1 to -30 (West 2022).
84. The three bills are respectively:
1. New Jersey Cannabis Regulatory, Enforcement Assistance, and Marketplace
Modernization Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6I-31 to -56 (West 2022).
2. 2020 N.J. Assemb. Bill No. 1897, Pub. L. 2021, c.19.
The bill decriminalized marijuana and hashish possession. It reformed criminal and
civil penalties for marijuana and hashish offenses and provided remedies for people
already facing certain marijuana charges. See id.
3. 2021 N.J. Senate Bill No. 3454.
The bill clarified marijuana and cannabis use and possession penalties for individuals
younger than 21 years old. The legislation corrects inconsistencies in A21 and A1897
concerning marijuana and cannabis penalties for those underage. See id.
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for adults 21 years and older.85 It expands the powers of the CRC86 to
regulate the purchase, sale, cultivation, manufacturing, packaging,
transportation, and delivery of marijuana and to oversee the applications for
licensing of marijuana businesses.87 The CRC was initially created to
administer the state’s medicinal marijuana program but is now the main
governing body responsible for establishing rules and regulations
governing the sale and purchase of recreational marijuana and overseeing
licensing for all areas of the marijuana industry. The Commission adopted
its initial rules on August 19, 2021,88 and underscored that the rules were
based on the CRC’s two core values of “equity and safety.”89 The rules
further specify that in order to opt-out of marijuana commerce within their
borders, municipalities can enact a local ordinance or regulation that
prohibits the operation of any one or more classes of marijuana business
within the jurisdiction.90 Such an ordinance may also include the
authorization or prohibition of outdoor cultivation.91
Municipalities that do not want to prohibit marijuana commerce outright
can enact an ordinance or regulation that establishes a numerical limit on
the number of marijuana businesses and types of licensed businesses
operating within their borders,92 can determine location, manner, and times
of operation of marijuana businesses,93 can establish civil penalties for the

85. The New Jersey Cannabis Regulatory, Enforcement Assistance, and Marketplace
Modernization Act, 2020 N.J. Assemb. Bill No. 21, Pub. L. 2021, c. 16 (codified at N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 24:6I-31 (West 2022)).
86. The Cannabis Regulatory Commission, created by Pub. L.2019, c. 153 had initially
been created to oversee the state’s medical cannabis program, which is primarily set forth in
the Jake Honig Compassionate Use Medical Cannabis Act, Pub. L.2009, c. 307.
87. 2020 N.J. Assemb. Bill No. 2, Pub. L. 2021, c. 16 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. §
24:6I-31 to -56 (West 2022)).
88. See generally N.J. CANNABIS REGUL. COMM’N, 53 NJR 9(2), PERSONAL USE OF
CANNABIS
RULES
(2021),
https://www.nj.gov/cannabis/documents/rules/NJAC
%201730%20Personal%20Use%20Cannabis.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Q5L-N8LW].
89. See Commission Members, N.J. CANNABIS REGUL. COMM’N, https://www.nj.
gov/cannabis/about/members/ [https://perma.cc/PA5M-BVWQ] (last visited Feb. 22, 2022).
90. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 17:30-5.1(b) (2022) (“A municipality may enact and amend
an ordinance or regulation to prohibit the operation of any one or more classes of cannabis
business within the jurisdiction of the municipality pursuant to N.J.S.A. 24:6I–45(b), and
such prohibiting ordinance shall apply throughout the municipality.”).
91. See id.
92. See id. § 17:30-5.1(a)(1) (“A municipality may enact an ordinance or
regulation . . . [t]hat establishes a numerical limit on the number of cannabis businesses,
provided that any such ordinance or regulation shall specify the maximum number of each
class of license that is allowed within the municipality and for which the municipality has
established a numerical limit.”).
93. See id. § 17:30-5.1(a)(2) (“A municipality may enact an ordinance or
regulation . . . [t]hat governs the location, manner, and times of operation of cannabis
businesses, except for the times of operation of a delivery service, including an ordinance or
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violation of such rules,94 can impose a separate local licensing
requirement,95 and can enact a 2% transfer tax on any sales between
marijuana businesses.96
The licensing process, led by the CRC, is also an opportunity for
intrastate collaboration. After the receipt of a license application from the
Commission, municipalities have the opportunity to submit their
preference(s) on which applicants seeking to operate within their town
should be issued a license.97 The involvement of municipalities is even
more evident during the licensing process because marijuana businesses
can only be licensed by the CRC if they have demonstrated support from
the municipality and they operate in compliance with municipality
restrictions. Specifically, the business applicant must first seek zoning
approval of a proposed location for the business premises of license
applicants.98
To add to the regulatory freedom of municipalities, it should be noted
that even though they have no authority to prohibit their residents from
possessing or consuming legal weed, they can prohibit the consumption of
marijuana items through smoking, vaping, or aerosolizing in all places
where tobacco smoking is prohibited under the N.J. Smoke-Free Air Act.99
They can also prohibit the consumption of marijuana in any indoor public
place such as bars, restaurants, sport venues, etc.100 On this point, the N.J.

regulation that requires a cannabis business premises to be a certain distance from the
closest church, synagogue, temple, or other place used exclusively for religious worship; or
from the closest school, playground, park, or child daycare facility.”).
94. See id. § 17:30-5.1(a)(3) (“A municipality may enact an ordinance or
regulation . . . [t]hat establishes civil penalties for a violation of such ordinance or
regulation.”).
95. See id. § 17:30-5.1(a)(4) (“A municipality may enact an ordinance or
regulation . . . [t]hat imposes a separate local licensing requirement.”).
96. See id. § 17:30-5.1(j) (“A municipality may adopt an ordinance imposing a transfer
tax or user tax on the sale of any usable cannabis or cannabis products by a cannabis
establishment located within the municipality pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:48I–1.”).
97. See id. § 17:30-5.1(e) (“A municipality may provide input to the Commission as to
the municipality’s preferences for licensure pursuant to N.J.A.C. 17:30–6.3.”).
98. See id. § 17:30-5.1(f) (“A municipality and its governing body entrusted with zoning
or the regulation of land use may provide zoning approval of a proposed location of a
license applicant’s cannabis business premises . . . .”).
99. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-58 (West 2022) (stating that “[s]moking is
prohibited . . . in an indoor public place, [or] workplace,” unless otherwise provided for in
the statute).
100. See id. § 24:6I-31 (“[A] municipality would be empowered to enact an ordinance
making it unlawful for any person 21 years of age or older to consume any cannabis item in
a public place, other than school property (which would be punishable as a disorderly
persons offense), and the ordinance could provide for a civil penalty of up to $200 per
violation.”); see also Can a Municipality Prohibit the Consumption of Cannabis on Public
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State League of Municipalities argues that due to the broad definition of
public place as defined by N.J. Statute § 26:3D-57, a municipality in effect
has the authority to restrict the consumption by any means, even to a
private residence.101 The only real limit on municipalities’ regulatory
discretion is that they cannot restrict the transportation or delivery of
marijuana items.102 Dozens of localities had already passed ordinances that
outlawed sales or possession of the drug in 2019, before the legislature
legalized it.103 However, the bill clarified that the ban on marijuana could
only be valid if enacted after the bill and that previous bans were null.104
According to the New Jersey Herald, nearly 71% of towns across New
Jersey — around 400 municipalities — have opted out of the recreational
marijuana industry and passed ordinances that prohibit marijuana
cultivation facilities, manufacturers, wholesalers distributors, delivery
companies, and legal weed dispensaries completely as of September
2021.105 According to the same study, 98 municipalities, mostly in South
Jersey and Central Jersey, passed ordinances allowing legal weed
dispensaries within their borders.106 Forty-one municipalities passed
ordinances that specifically prohibit dispensaries but allow some
combination of the other five classes of New Jersey marijuana licenses,
from cultivation centers to delivery companies, and ten municipalities
Property and in Public Places?, N.J. ST. LEAGUE MUNS., https://www.njlm.org
/Faq.aspx?QID=286 [https://perma.cc/UND4-MXRF] (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
101. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6I-31 (West 2022). New Jersey law explicitly defines
public space. See id. § 26:3D-57 (“‘Indoor public place’ means a structurally enclosed place
of business, commerce or other service-related activity, whether publicly or privately owned
or operated on a for-profit or nonprofit basis, which is generally accessible to the
public . . . .”).
102. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 17:30-5.1(l) (2021) (“In no case may a municipality restrict
the transportation of cannabis items through, or delivery of cannabis items within, the
municipality by adopting an ordinance or any other measure. Any such restriction shall be
deemed void and unenforceable.”).
103. See Alan Greenblatt, supra note 5.
104. See The New Jersey Cannabis Regulatory, Enforcement Assistance, and
Marketplace Modernization Act, 2020 N.J. Assemb. Bill No. 21, Pub. L. 2021, c.16
(codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6I-31 (West 2022)) (“Only an ordinance to prohibit
operations by one or more license classes enacted pursuant to the specific authority to do so
by the bill would be valid and enforceable; any ordinance enacted prior to the bill’s effective
date addressing the issue of prohibition within the jurisdiction of a municipality would be
null and void, and that municipality could only prohibit the operation of one or more classes
of cannabis business by enactment of a new ordinance in accordance with the bill’s
provisions.”).
105. See Mike Davis & Susanne Cervenka, Legal Weed Dispensaries Banned in More
than 70% of NJ Towns: Where Will You Buy Marijuana?, N.J. HERALD (Aug. 23, 2021, 9:42
AM), https://www.njherald.com/story/news/local/new-jersey/marijuana/2021/08/23/nj-legal
-weed-dispensaries-marijuana-legalization-opt-out-in/8211230002/
[https://perma.cc/EMU3-WV7P].
106. See id.

2022] INTRASTATE CONFLICTS AND LESSONS LEARNT

633

opted out of the marijuana industry completely but made an exception for
medical marijuana uses.107
For instance, according to The Philadelphia Inquirer, Ocean City
adopted an ordinance that bans businesses that cultivate, manufacture, test,
or sell marijuana, and other shore towns, including Stone Harbor, Sea Isle
City, Wildwood Crest, and Cape May, were “well along in the process of
passing similar ordinances” as of April 2021.108
The New Jersey State League of Municipalities, together with the
Institute of Local Government Attorneys, have played an important role in
guiding municipalities through the opt-out process. In particular, they
organized meetings and published guidance documents and sample opt-out
ordinances to assist those municipalities that were uncertain as to the
implications of the liberalization of marijuana commerce.109
It should be noted, however, that many municipalities adopted opt-out
ordinances only to buy time (wait and see approach) and be able to draw up
rules for the new industry.110 The state, in fact, allows municipalities to
opt-in at any time but limits the opt-out window to 180 days.111 According
to The Herald, localities needed a time-saving option.112 This is evident,
for example, in the case of the city of Paterson, the third most populated
city in New Jersey after Newark and Jersey City.113 In August 2021, the
City Council banned all recreational marijuana businesses from Paterson,
but the council members stated that this was a temporary decision and that
they would eventually want to strike a compromise to allow some types of
marijuana businesses to reap the benefits of a regulated and taxed
market.114

107. See id.
108. Amy S. Rosenberg, Legally Buying Weed at the Jersey Shore Will Depend on What
Town You’re In, PHILA. INQUIRER (Apr. 26, 2021), https://www.inquirer.com/news/newjersey-shore-cannabis-law-opt-out-20210426.html [https://perma.cc/Y2FZ-YP4V].
109. See Cannabis Legalization, N.J. ST. LEAGUE MUNS., https://www.njlm.org
/969/Cannabis-Legalization [https://perma.cc/3VVP-PCUY] (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
110. See Mike Davis, NJ Legal Weed Was Overwhelmingly Backed by Voters; So Why
Are Towns Banning It?, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Apr. 23, 2021, 9:04 PM),
https://www.app.com/story/news/local/new-jersey/marijuana/2021/04/19/nj-marijuanalegalization-legal-weed-dispensary-ordinances/7227609002/ [https://perma.cc/LJ24-L293].
111. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6I-45 (West 2022).
112. See Davis & Cervenka, supra note 105.
113. See Joe Malinconico, Paterson City Council Votes No on Recreational Cannabis
Businesses, NORTHJERSEY.COM (Aug. 8, 2021, 6:21 PM), https://www.north
jersey.com/story/news/paterson-press/2021/08/06/new-jersey-marijuana-legalizationpaterson-votes-no-pot-businesses/5514003001/ [https://perma.cc/EHG4-G9JE].
114. See id.
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The same is true for municipalities such as Cherry Hill, which set a
timeline to revisit the opt-out in February 2022;115 South Orange adopted
only a temporary ban;116 and Toms River, a village of 95,438 people that
banned marijuana business in July 2021 but also introduced a companion
measure that sets a December 31, 2021, expiration date on the business
ban.117 The expiration date was deemed necessary in order to give Toms
River’s marijuana committee more time to continue discussions on whether
to permit weed-related businesses in the township and, if so, to decide
where they should be located.118 The municipality of Lacey even called a
referendum in October 2021 to let citizens decide whether marijuana
should be sold and cultivated in the town.119 Other municipalities such as
Lakewood, on the other hand, adopted an outright ban to meet the decision
of their voters during the November 2020 referendum.120
The consequence of the patchwork of regulations and rules in New
Jersey is that the black market continues to thrive. But this is, in the
opinion of the Author, not an excuse to stop the regulatory effort. As
explained above, the opt-out ordinances are in many cases only temporary
measures that municipalities adopt in order to buy time and design detailed
regulations of the market.
This is also what happened in other states, such as Colorado, where after
an initial refusal to cooperate with the state, municipalities have started to
embrace the regulation of commercial marijuana.121 From this perspective,
the outcome of a state’s non-pre-emptive and derogatory approach is one of
successful intrastate collaboration that often is not achieved when preemptive legislation is in place.

115. See Anthony Bellano, Cherry Hill Bans Recreational Pot, Sets Timeline to
Reconsider, PATCH (July 29, 2021, 11:57 AM), https://patch.com/new-jersey/cherryhill/
cherry-hill-bans-recreational-pot-sets-timeline-reconsider [https://perma.cc/J9GL-R863].
116. See South Orange Passes Temporary Cannabis Opt-Out Ordinance, TAPINTO
SOMA (Aug. 21, 2021, 10:00 AM), https://www.tapinto.net/towns/soma/sections/
government/articles/south-orange-passes-temporary-cannabis-opt-out-ordinance
[https://perma.cc/DUS2-SKEV].
117. See Jean Mikle, Toms River Passes Weed Business Ban, but It Could Expire Dec.
31, ASBURY PARK PRESS (July 15, 2021, 5:01 AM), https://www.app.com/story/
news/local/new-jersey/marijuana/2021/07/15/nj-marijuana-legalization-toms-river-bansweed-shops-but-could-expire-december/7963991002/ [https://perma.cc/7ULU-5TB8].
118. See id.
119. See Kimberlee Bongard, Lacey Voters to Decide Whether Marijuana Should Be Sold
in Town, PATCH (Oct. 18, 2021, 4:57 PM), https://patch.com/new-jersey/lacey/lacey-votersdecide-whether-marijuana-should-be-sold-town [https://perma.cc/NGT4-DF75].
120. See Joe Strupp, Lakewood Unanimously Bans Marijuana Sales, Production in Town,
ASBURY PARK PRESS (Apr. 23, 2021, 11:59 AM), https://www.app.com/story/
news/local/new-jersey/marijuana/2021/04/23/nj-marijuana-lakewood-bans-both-sales-andproduction/7335547002/ [https://perma.cc/DH7U-9NBY].
121. See Davis & Cervenka, supra note 105.
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The New Jersey case study confirms that the opt-out provisions go hand
to hand with an extensive recognition of local government’s powers
enshrined in the state constitution, the state legislation, and the state
constitutional jurisprudence.
Respectively, New Jersey State Constitution Article 4, § VII, clause 11
(the so-called “liberal construction” article of the Constitution) confers
implied regulatory powers on municipalities and counties and encourages
the courts to interpret laws concerning municipal corporations in favor of
local governments:
The provisions of this Constitution and of any law concerning municipal
corporations formed for local government, or concerning counties, shall
be liberally construed in their favor. The powers of counties and such
municipal corporations shall include not only those granted in express
terms but also those of necessary or fair implication, or incident to the
powers expressly conferred, or essential thereto, and not inconsistent with
or prohibited by this Constitution or by law.122

The liberal approach to local power enshrined in the constitution is further
complemented by state legislation. Remarkably, N.J. Statute § 40:41A-28
defines municipalities as “the broad repository of local police power in
terms of the right and power to legislate for the general health, safety and
welfare of their residents,”123 and confers all municipalities “the fullest and
most complete powers possible over the internal affairs of such
municipalities for local self-government.”124 This recognition of local
police power constitutes a strong basis for sustaining local legislative
acts.125 New Jersey courts have implemented this liberal approach by
presuming the validity of local enactments,126 and assuming that local laws
are not pre-empted by state law unless they violate the New Jersey
Constitution, are ultra vires,127 or are unreasonable.128
Like California, the situation in New Jersey highlights a need for explicit
delegation language in the state constitution, in state legislation, and in
state jurisprudence to support a sustainable delegation of regulatory powers
to localities.

122. N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, cl. 11.
123. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:41A-28 (West 2021).
124. Id. § 40:42-4.
125. See Michael A. Pane, Choosing a Remedy — Local Legislative Latitude, in N.J.
PRAC., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 35A, § 29:4 (4th ed. 2021).
126. See Brown v. City of Newark, 552 A.2d 125, 135 (N.J. 1989).
127. See Pane, supra note 125, at § 29:4.
128. See Dock Watch Hollow Quarry Pit, Inc. v. Warren Twp., 361 A.2d 12, 19 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976), aff’d, 377 A.2d 1201 (N.J. 1977).
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V. RECREATIONAL MARIJUANA ‘OPT-OUT’ PROVISIONS IN NEW YORK
New Jersey’s legalization of marijuana has pressured New York to get
up to speed with their neighbor or — as New York Governor Kathy Hochul
stated — see “all the money go to New Jersey” as a consequence.129 On
March 31, 2021, former New York Governor Andrew Cuomo signed the
Marihuana Regulation and Taxation Act, legalizing recreational marijuana
in New York state.130 The law allows possession of up to three ounces of
marijuana for recreational use or 24 grams of concentrated marijuana, such
as oils derived from a marijuana plant.131
The intent of the law was to create significant new revenue, reduce the
illegal drug market and violent crime, end the racially disparate impact of
existing marijuana laws, increase employment, and strengthen New York’s
agriculture sector, among other goals.132 New York Governor Kathy
Hochul reiterated those intents in September 2021 at the Business Council
of New York State’s annual meeting, stating marijuana legalization would
generate “thousands and thousands of jobs” in the state and that she
intended to make regulatory appointments for the industry to get
implementation underway.133
While the New York and New Jersey laws have many similarities, one
of the main differences between the two resides in the provisions for home
grow: in October 2021, the New York Cannabis Board issued rules
allowing residents to grow up to six marijuana plants at home,134 whereas
New Jersey’s cannabis law does not contain a home grow provision. The
other difference resides in taxation. While in New Jersey, adult-use sales
are subject to the state sales tax of 6.625%, and each municipality can
impose a maximum local tax of 2% of the receipts from each sale by a
marijuana cultivation, manufacturer, wholesaler, and retailer, cannabis
products in New York will be subject to a state tax of 9%, plus an
additional 4% local tax that would be split between counties and cities,
towns, or villages.135

129. Kathy Hochul, Bolton Landing Business Council 2021 Annual Meeting 09 24 2021,
YOUTUBE (Sept. 24, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mnhPO6ULMjI [https://
perma.cc/7KH8-AB2T] (statement at 20:55).
130. S.B. 854, 244 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021) (enacted).
131. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 222.05 (McKinney 2021).
132. N.Y. CANNABIS LAW § 2 (McKinney 2021).
133. Hochul, supra note 129.
134. See Cannabis Control Board Approves Regulations for Cultivation of Medical
Cannabis, OFF. CANNABIS MGMT. (Oct. 21, 2021), https://cannabis.ny.gov/news/cannabiscontrol-board-approves-regulations-cultivation-medical-cannabis [https://perma.cc/7SJS-GS
3Y].
135. See Nikolas Komyati, Jessica Gonzalez & Taylor Anderson, Comparing Cannabis
Laws of Neighboring States: NY and NJ, LAW.COM (June 8, 2021, 12:06 PM), https://www.
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Similar to New Jersey’s law, New York’s marijuana legislation created a
new Office of Cannabis Management governed by a Cannabis Control
Board to oversee and implement the law (collectively referred to as OCM).
The OCM is responsible for issuing licenses, developing regulations, and
overseeing the State’s existing Medical Marijuana Program and
Cannabinoid Hemp Program, previously regulated by the Department of
Health.136
New York’s decriminalization statute is less permissive of local
governments compared with New Jersey’s. For example, New York
permits towns, cities, and villages to opt-out of adult-use marijuana retail
dispensaries or on-site consumption licenses from locating within their
jurisdictions, but unlike New Jersey’s — where municipalities could optout again in five years — New York’s provides for a final deadline on
December 31, 2021, with no option to opt-out at a future date.137
Furthermore, the local opt-out law is subject to a permissive referendum
governed by Section 24 of the Municipal Home Rule Law.138 This allows
10% of qualified voters within the municipality to petition a referendum on
whether or not to approve the local law to be placed on the ballot at the
next general election of state or local government officials for the
municipality.139
Similar to what happens in New Jersey, towns, cities, and villages are
permitted to pass local laws and regulations governing the time, place, and
manner of adult-use retail dispensaries and on-site consumption licenses.140
This means that local governments may pass laws and regulations
pertaining to local zoning, the location of licensees, hours of operations,
and adherence to local building codes.141
Municipalities are also involved in the licensing process but to a lesser
extent than in New Jersey. In New York, before a business applies for an
adult-use retail dispensary or on-site consumption license, it must notify the
municipality and seek an opinion for or against the granting of the
license.142 Such opinion then becomes part of the record and is used by the

law.com/thelegalintelligencer/2021/06/08/comparing-cannabis-laws-of-neighboring-statesny-and-nj/ [https://perma.cc/RP6U-PLQ9].
136. See N.Y. CANNABIS LAW § 10 (McKinney 2021).
137. See id. § 131.
138. See N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 24 (McKinney 2021).
139. See id.
140. N.Y. CANNABIS LAW § 131 (McKinney 2021).
141. See N.Y. OFF. OF CANNABIS MGMT., WHAT IS IN THE LAW: LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 2
(2021), https://cannabis.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2021/09/cannabis-management-factsheet-9-21-local-government-06.pdf [https://perma.cc/QJY6-QWXN].
142. See NY CANNABIS LAW § 76 (McKinney 2021).
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OCM to determine whether to grant or deny the application.143 In New
Jersey, as seen above, the authorization of the municipalities does not
constitute an opinion but a real pre-condition for the issuance of a license.
The different ways in which the two states consider municipalities’
approval reveals a very different approach to the sovereignty of
municipalities. New York state prefers to make the final decision on the
applications for adult-use retail dispensary or on-site consumption license
and could, in theory, overcome the negative opinion of a municipality.144
This approach to decriminalization reveals that the state of New York is
less inclined to delegate full decision-making power to municipalities and
therefore suggests that New York is a state where delegation to local power
is still controversial. This is also somehow evident in the language used by
legislators in the decriminalization bill that explicitly mentions ‘preemption’ of local laws pertaining to the operation or licensure of registered
organizations, adult-use marijuana licenses, or cannabinoid hemp
licenses.145 It is clear that the licensing process is centralized and managed
by the Office of Cannabis Management, but the state here wanted to point
out that it actually “pre-empts” any attempt of municipalities to regulate the
field.
The state of New York is evidently less keen on delegating powers to
local government than California and New Jersey. Such a moderate
approach to delegation is noticeable in the New York Constitution and in
the state statutes that govern the distribution of powers within the state.
The New York Constitution Article IX, § 2(c) and New York Municipal
Home Rule Law § 10(1)(ii)(a)(12) confer local governments the power to
adopt laws “not inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution”146 and
that relate to, among other things, the “protection, order, conduct, safety,
health and well-being of persons or property.”147
The difference between California, that confers “all local, police,
sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general
laws,”148 and New Jersey, that confers implied powers,149 is striking, and it
is reflected in the more restrictive opt-out options.

143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id. § 131 (“[A]ll county, town, city and village governing bodies are hereby
preempted from adopting any law, rule, ordinance, regulation or prohibition pertaining to
the operation or licensure of registered organizations, adult-use cannabis licenses or
cannabinoid hemp licenses.”).
146. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(c)(i); N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(i) (McKinney
2021).
147. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(c)(10); N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(ii)(a)(12)
(McKinney 2021).
148. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7.
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In the Author’s opinion, New York is an exemplary case of a liberal
state that uses conservative techniques in order to be more liberal. In other
words, New York is so keen on decriminalizing marijuana and opening the
market that the state is only delegating a certain amount of decision-making
power to cities, leaving them with little wiggle-room as to the extent to
which the decriminalization takes place. At the time of writing, it is still
very early to assess the response of the municipalities, but a few have
already passed opt-out ordinances to buy time and see how the regulatory
framework will unfold.150 News outlets report that Colonie, a town in the
Capital Region,151 Wellsville village,152 Mount Kisco, Eastchester, Somers
and North Castle in the lower Hudson Valley,153 Chautauqua along with the
towns of Gerry, Busti, Carroll, Clymer, Harmony, Ellery, and the villages
of Lakewood and Cassadaga in western New York154 have already opted
out. Like the towns in New Jersey, it should be noted that the opt-out
ordinances in these New York towns may be temporary and that the
localities may just want to buy time before allowing dispensaries within
their borders.
CONCLUSION
This Essay did not assess the merits of certain marijuana policies or the
desirability of delegation of marijuana regulatory powers to local
governments. As seen in the California, New Jersey, and New York case
studies, the assessment of such policies involves complex economic,
political, and legal considerations. The aim of this Essay was, instead, an

149. See N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, cl. 11.
150. The Rockefeller Institute has been tracking the opt-in/opt-out decision-making by
localities. See Heather Trela, To Opt In or Opt Out — That Is the Question for NYS
Municipalities, ROCKEFELLER INST. GOV’T (Oct. 29, 2021), https://rockinst.org/blog/to-optin-or-opt-out-that-is-the-question-for-nys-municipalities/ [https://perma.cc/8VQH-6FXV].
151. See Morgan McKay, NY Cities Grappling with Marijuana Opt-out Decisions, NY1
(Sept. 16, 2021, 9:30 PM), https://www.ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/politics/2021/09/17/nycities-grappling-with-marijuana-opt-out-decisions [https://perma.cc/LS33-D6B3].
152. See Chris Potter, Will Your Town Sell Weed? Why Some NY Municipalities Will Opt
Out of Marijuana Law, STAR GAZETTE (Oct. 20, 2021), https://www.star
gazette.com/story/news/local/2021/10/20/new-york-weed-marijuana-law-opt-out-southerntier-towns/8450033002/ [https://perma.cc/6FLJ-R688].
153. See Mount Kisco Mayor: Village Taking a Wait-and-See Approach to Retail
Marijuana, Consumption Lounges, NEWS 12 N.J. (July 7, 2021), https://newjersey.
news12.com/mount-vernon-mayor-village-taking-a-wait-and-see-approach-to-retailmarijuana-consumption-lounges [https://perma.cc/63RF-NE24].
154. See Gregory Bacon, Chautauqua Town Opts Out of Pot Dispensaries, OBSERVER
(Sept. 16, 2021), https://www.observertoday.com/news/page-one/2021/09/chautauqua-townopts-out-of-pot-dispensaries/ [https://perma.cc/S2LP-KS8J].
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analysis of the deployment of opt-out provisions to resolve intrastate
political and legal conflict.
The Essay has demonstrated that the peculiar circumstances of
marijuana decriminalization have forced states to think “out of the box”
and to work out alternatives to traditional pre-emption of local action. It
has presented the different ways in which states have delegated regulatory
power to municipalities and provided in-depth insights into the regulatory
framework of the states of California, New Jersey, and New York.
As the California and New Jersey case studies demonstrated, the broader
constitutional framework that governs intrastate relations plays a
fundamental role in promoting local government. The delegation of
powers to localities is sustainable only if it is coupled with a solid
recognition of local power in the state constitution and in the related state
constitutional jurisprudence. The case study of New York has confirmed
that a more restrictive approach to delegation is due, or possibly influenced
by, the limits set out in the state constitution. The 17 states that provided
for opt-out provisions arguably did so in recognition of cities’ local landuse authority and police powers, but most of these states have not included
such recognition of local powers in their constitutions.155
This is arguably also the reason why Professor Paul A. Diller suggested
that a broader use of constitutional home rule could represent the solution
to “the urban disadvantage that exists in many state legislatures.”156 He
described the delegation of power to local government as “a modest
corrective [that could] shift the cumulative local, state, and national legal
framework back toward the views of the national median voter.”157 This
Essay has contributed to the work of Professor Diller by providing
evidence that such a shift towards local power is workable. The way in
which states have approached marijuana decriminalization could represent
the beginning of a new era of intrastate relations just as the New Deal
represented a shift in our conception of federal-state relations and led to an
era of “cooperative federalism.”158
To conclude, the Author suggests that the recognition of local police
powers is potentially applicable to other areas of state policy and invites

155. See Di Gioia, supra note 41.
156. Diller, supra note 17, at 1051.
157. Id. at 1048.
158. The term “cooperative federalism” appeared for the first time in a court case in 1950
in Alaska Steamship Co. v. Mullaney. 180 F.2d 805, 816 n.14 (9th Cir. 1950). In Mullaney,
the Ninth Circuit cited a law review article by Samuel Mermin entitled “Cooperative
Federalism” Again: State and Municipal Legislation Penalizing Violation of Existing and
Future Federal Requirements, 57 YALE L.J. 1, 18 (1947).
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policymakers to think about possible ways in which they can avoid preemption in favor of collaboration with local authorities.

